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The study of bank interest rate spreads is central to our understanding of the process of 
financial intermediation.  Data limitations generally restrict empirical analyses to 
interest rate spreads that are constructed from bank income statements and balance 
sheets.  In this paper we make use of a data set that allows us directly to compute interest 
rate spreads based on individual bank loan and deposit rates reported on a monthly basis 
to the Central Bank of Chile.  The information is disaggregated by unit of account (peso, 
inflation-indexed, and dollar) over the period 1994-2001.  We find that the estimated 
impacts of industry concentration, business cycle variables, and monetary policy 
variables differ markedly between interest rate spreads based on balance sheet data and 
interest rate spreads based on disaggregated loan and deposit data.  Since empirical 
work on interest spreads is used for guiding policy recommendations, these findings have 
important implications for the interpretation of interest spreads regressions.  Our 
analysis calls for some caution in the interpretation of estimated empirical determinants 
of bank spreads that are constructed from income statements and balance sheet data. At 
the same time, our analysis shows how information from the two types of interest rate 
spreads can be combined to create a more complete portrait of bank behavior than either 
type alone is capable of creating.  The results for Chile suggest the potential importance 
of gathering such disaggregated data in other countries. 
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I.  Introduction 
Banking has long been recognized as an important factor in economic development.   
Adam Smith (1776) singled out Scottish banks as a reason for Scotland’s growth.
1  
Linkages between finance and development also played an important role in the work of 
Schumpeter (1911), Gurley and Shaw (1960), Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon (1973).  
The link between finance and development has been affirmed more recently by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998).  New work also stresses the importance of more efficient financial 
intermediation for economic growth as well as for the allocation of resources at any point 
in time.
2   
Whether or not the cost of financial intermediation plays a crucial role in financial 
development is a more disputed topic.  On the one hand, many papers have focused on 
the negative impact of taxes (e.g., unremunerated reserve requirements) on the spread 
between loan and deposit rates.
3  This same literature emphasizes that financial 
repression raises the cost of finance in curb markets that spring up to circumvent 
excessive bank controls.   
On the other hand, Goldsmith (1969, p. 47) believed that financial development in the 
United States, Canada, and Europe took place during the last two centuries with roughly 
stable costs of intermediation.
4  A theoretical justification for such a finding can be found 
in the credit rationing literature stemming from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) where adverse 
selection in credit markets creates non-price rationing of credit.   In addition, the use of 
collateral, escrow accounts, down payments, and other contractual provisions can affect 
the expected loan return without explicitly altering the contractual interest rate.    
Despite these caveats concerning the role of non-price factors in financial intermediation, 
policymakers generally pay attention to bank interest rate spreads.  Mergers and 
acquisitions of banks sometimes produce increased interest rate spreads that raise anti-
trust issues.  Central banks worry about increases in spreads during times of financial 
distress.  And capital account liberalization is often accompanied by changes in interest 
rate spreads that raise concerns about financial stability. 
                                                 
1 One relevant passage refers to the expansion of commercial credit: “The commerce of Scotland, which at present is 
not very great, was still more inconsiderable when the two first banking companies were established; and those 
companies would have had but little trade, had they confined their business to the discounting of bills of exchange. 
They invented, therefore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by granting what they call cash accounts.   
Credits of this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in all different parts of the world. But the 
easy terms upon which the Scotch banking companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar to them, and 
have perhaps been the principal cause, both of the great trade of those companies, and of the benefit which the country 
has received from it.”  (Book II, Section 2:  Of Money Considered as a particular Branch of the General Stock of the 
Society) 
2 See, for example, King and Levine (1993), Greenwood and Smith (1997), and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). 
3 See the papers in Honohan (2003) for recent treatments of this topic. 
4 Goldsmith (1969, p. 91) states that “Interest rates are thus secondary, though by no means unimportant determinants 
of the [financial interrelations ratio, FIR]….They are in much the same position as…the asset preferences of different 
groups of holders and issuers of financial instruments, the legal provisions affecting the issuance of securities and the 
operation of financial intermediaries, the policy of the monetary authorities, and the factors determining the balance of 
payments.”  2
In an influential paper Bernanke (1983) defined the cost of financial intermediation (CFI) 
to be the wedge between the gross cost paid by a borrower to a bank and the net return 
received by a saver.
5  In practice, most empirical work approximates the CFI in the 
banking industry through balance sheet and income statement data.  The idea is to obtain 
“implicit” loan and deposit rates offered by each individual bank. The question then is 
which is the best method to obtain such an “implicit rate”. Although there is no single 
definition for interest margins in the empirical literature
6, the predominant one is the net 
interest margin (NIM), the ratio of total interest revenue minus total interest expenses as 
percentage of earning assets. By including expenditures and income from all types of 
deposit and loan operations, the net interest margin creates an average interest spread.  
Empirical work, primarily reduced-form regressions analysis, has examined the impact of 
(aggregate and idiosyncratic) risk
7, industry structure
8, macroeconomics
9 and regulatory 
issues
10 on NIMs.  Recent studies have provided benchmark analyses of NIMs for the 
Chilean financial system.
11   
 
Due to lack of data, there are almost no studies that use actual loan and deposit interest 
rate data by individual banks.
12  In most cases, banks do not report the whole array of 
specific interest rates charged and paid.
13  Recent papers study interest rate spreads using 
disaggregated data by type of operation but not by individual banks. For example, Catao 
(1998) uses Argentinean aggregate Pesos and US dollar deposit and lending rates to study 
the determination of spreads under a dual currency framework.  Agénor, Aizenman and 
Hoffmaister (1999) use the same dataset to study the impact of contagion and output 
fluctuations on spreads. Finally, Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) study the effects of 
concentration in EU banking systems using different types of loans and deposit rates. 
Two other papers use individual bank data from Italy that was collected after the 
introduction of a usury law in 1997.
14  
 
                                                 
5 Bernanke argued the CFI plays a fundamental role in the efficient allocation of credit.  According to his view, the 
disruption of the financial sector by the banking and debt crises in the Great Depression raised the real cost of 
intermediation between lenders and borrowers, which reinforced the decline in aggregate output.   
6 See, for example, Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000). In that paper, six different measures of interest margins are used in 
order to deal with measurement problems that arise when using accounting data to approximate the CFI. 
7 The studies about the relationship of bank margins with default and/or interest rate risk include Ho and Saunders 
(1981), Angbazo (1997), McShane and Sharpe (1985), Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000), and Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000). 
8 Among the studies of bank concentration and NIM’s are McShane and Sharpe (1985), Ruthenberg and Elias (1996), 
Williams (1998), Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Sinkey and Carter (2000), 
and Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001). 
9 The relation between business cycle variables and net interest margins is examined in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) and Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000). 
10 Angbazo (1997) examines the effects of capital requirements. 
11 The NIM studies include Fuentes and Basch (2000) and Ahumada and Budnevich (1999).  In the broader context of 
this study, Berstein and Fuentes (2003) analyze the pass-through of changes in the monetary policy rate to loan rates, 
while Budnevich, Franken, and Paredes (2001) look at economies of scale and scope in the Chilean banking industry. 
12 Interest rate net income accounts for 80% or more of bank profits as reported in Mercer (1992). 
13 Banks do not always publish even the prime rate or, on the liability side, retail deposit rates. 
14 These are Alessie, Hochguertel, and Weber (2001) who analyze the impact of the introduction of this usury law and 
Bertola, Hochguertel and Koeniger (2002) who study the effects of price discrimination in the spread between 
borrowing and lending rates. 
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Our paper makes use of a dataset for Chile that contains interest rate data by individual 
banks and by type of operation.  We also make use of balance sheet and income 
statement data to calculate interest margins for each bank.  Our study is the first one to 
use both individual bank data as well as balance sheet data for the calculation of interest 
rate spreads in order to study issues that affect the cost of financial intermediation.  We 
find that measures of volatility (risk) affect margins based on bank balance sheet data and 
spreads based on interest rate data in the same way. However, the estimated impact of 
concentration and macro variables (business cycle and monetary policy) differs markedly 
depending on whether balance sheet data or disaggregated interest rate data is used to 
construct the spreads.    
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II develops the analytical 
motivation for empirical estimates of the determinants of interest rates spreads.  Section 
III describes the data and the empirical specification.  The results are contained in section 
IV and section V concludes. 
 
 
II.  Models of Interest Rate Spreads 
 
FINANCIAL MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE 
Almost all empirical models of bank spreads cite the influential dealership model of Ho 
and Saunders (1981), in which banks are modeled as if they operate like dealers setting 
bid-ask spreads in securities markets.  Although the research on bid-ask spreads in 
securities markets is not the primary focus of this paper, it forms a useful point of 
departure for the examination of models of banking spreads.  Beginning with the work of 
Demsetz (1968) researchers in empirical finance have sought to measure the determinants 
of bid-ask spreads in securities (primarily stock) markets.
15  Demsetz provided the 
theoretical argument for the existence of dealers in securities markets:  dealers provide 
immediacy (liquidity) that allows other market participant to buy and sell securities 
instantaneously.  In order to provide immediacy, dealers must hold an inventory of stocks 
and to be compensated for the costs of operation by charging a spread between the selling 
and buying price.    Over time, and especially with the work of Stoll (1978), these costs 
have become categorized into three types.
16  The first type is order-processing costs.  
These are the costs associated with operating as a dealer, including the rental of floor 
space, the cost of a seat on the exchange, computer costs, and so on.  The second type is 
inventory-holding costs.  These are the opportunity cost of the dealer’s funds plus the 
costs associated with uncertainty regarding the movement of the stock price.  For risk-
averse dealers, the uncertainty in stock price movements creates a cost associated with 
the risk of buying high and being forced to sell low.  The third type is adverse selection 
costs.  These costs arise from the fact that there are informed market participants who 
have inside information about future stock price movements.  To protect himself/herself 
against these participants, the dealer is forced to widen the spread.  Finally, the market 
                                                 
15 The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price at which a dealer will sell a security and the price at which the 
dealer will buy the security.   
16 See Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2003) or Stoll (2003) for a more detailed discussion of these costs.  4
microstructure literature has also recognized that market concentration may also affect 
the size of the bid-ask spread. 
 
These four factors--order-processing costs, inventory-holding  costs, adverse selection 
costs, and market structure--form the basis for empirical work on bid-ask yields.  Various 
proxies have been used for these factors in linear regression models.  A common proxy 
for order-processing costs is trading volume (with an expected negative sign).  There 
have been many proxies for inventory holding costs, of which share price (expected 
positive sign) and standard deviation of price or return (expected positive sign) are 
typical.  Adverse selection costs have been captured by the ratio of dollar trading volume 
to market capitalization (expected positive sign) as well as other similar measures.     
Market concentration is often measured by the Herfindahl index or the logarithm of the 
number of dealers (expected positive sign). 
 
The growing sophistication of empirical work in this area has been aided by the 
development of mathematical models of the dealer’s optimization problem.  Among 
these, Stoll (1989) and Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2003) are noteworthy for developing 
models of the interaction of adverse selection (traders with inside information)  and stock 
price uncertainty with the setting of the bid-ask spread.  
 
BANK INTEREST RATE SPREADS 
The market microstructure literature has identified the purpose of the dealer as one of 
providing liquidity to participants in the market.  Unlike the dealer, banks have several 
purposes.  Banks provide a means of payment (demand deposits), issue and hold non-
liquid loans, engage in asset transformation (e.g., duration transformation from long-term 
loans to short-term deposits, unit of account transformation from dollar liabilities to local 
currency denominated assets), and provide off-balance-sheet services (interest rate swaps, 
letters of credit, etc.).  Banks typically also operate with deposit insurance and are often 
required to hold non-interest bearing required reserves.  It is commonly argued that the 
structure of the bank balance sheet arises as a result of information asymmetries between 
borrowers, bankers, and depositors.   
 
The bank’s several purposes are more complex than the dealer’s problem of providing 
immediacy.  Not surprisingly, there is no commonly agreed counterpart in banking to the 
bid-ask spread in securities markets.  Indeed, in this paper we discuss the relative merits 
of net interest margins, average spreads, and marginal spreads as they relate to a bank’s 
operations.  We identify the conceptual difference between empirical regressions of 
spreads that are based on bank accounting identities and those which are motivated by 
maximizing models of bank behavior.  We suggest that different margins and spreads 
provide complementary empirical points of departure that can help to explain the 
behavior of banks in response to changes in market structure, interest rate uncertainty, 





Consider the following stylized bank balance sheet: 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Required Reserves (R)  Demand Deposits (DD) 
Short-term Assets ( S A )  Time Deposits (D) 
(Short-term) 
Long-term Assets ( L A )   
 Equity  (E) 
 







Net Interest Margin NIM
A
rA rA















Marginal interest rate spreads






The NIM measures an average return on assets relative to the explicit interest cost of 
funding those assets:  the average return on assets is  A r  while the average cost of funding 
those assets is  / D rD A .  The average spread is the difference between the average return 
on assets,  A r , and the marginal cost of funding out of time deposits,  D r .  The NIM, with 
its implicit inclusion of demand deposits and equity as zero-cost sources of funds, is 
useful in demonstrating profitability that permits banks to cover their fixed costs of 
operation.  The average spread, with its emphasis on the marginal cost of funding new 
assets, is a good measure of the marginal cost of financial intermediation between 
borrowers from banks and marginal providers of funds.  Both measures are of interest to 
policymakers interested in the viability of banks (ability to cover fixed costs) and the 
marginal efficiency of intermediation. 
 
Marginal spreads reflect the bank’s willingness to take duration risk (borrow short, lend 
long) with some fraction of the bank’s assets, while matching asset and deposit maturities 
(borrow short, lend short) with the other fraction of the assets.  Marginal spreads also 
arise when banks take unit of account risk by issuing domestic currency and dollar 
deposits that don’t match domestic currency and dollar loan positions.  The marginal 
spreads contain information that is not accessible by using the average spread or the 
NIM.  As a result, the marginal spreads can give an additional perspective on the process 
and cost of intermediation. 
  6
As an empirical matter (discussed more fully in Section III), we measure the NIM and the 
Average Spread using balance sheet and income statement figures, while marginal 
spreads use actual loan rate and deposit rate data that banks report to the Superintendent 
of Banks.   
 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF INTEREST MARGINS AND SPREADS 
The most common way to estimate the determinants of net interest margins is to start 
with the bank income statement: 
 
AD E r A r D NoninterestExpenses Costs Provisions+r Equity ≡+ + +  (1) 
 
where NoninterestExpenses refers to the expenses spent on servicing demand accounts 
minus commissions banks receive for off-balance sheet activities, Costs refers to 
overhead costs, Provisions are against loan write-offs, and  E r Equity  is Profits (return on 
equity times bank equity capital).  Beginning with the income identity, an expression for 




r A r D NoninterestExpenses Costs Provisions Equity
NIM r
AA A A A
−
≡≡ + + +  (2) 
 
Regressions based explicitly on this identity are very common.
17  Many other studies use 
this identity as the core of regressions that include other variables as well.
18    
 
COST FUNCTION APPROACH TO ESTIMATION OF THE SPREAD 
The income accounting identity can also be used to derive an expression for the spread 
based on maximizing behavior on the part of banks.  There are several relevant models.  
The first, which is known as the Monti-Klein bank model,
19 is based on the assumption 
that there is a cost function for running a bank that depends on the aggregate value of the 
assets being managed by the bank as well as other factors of production, such as capital 
and labor (K,L):  (; ,) Costs C A K L = .  Assuming that a bank maximizes  profits, the 
income accounting identity becomes: 
 
(; ,) AD Profits r A r D C A K L Provisions- NoninterestExpenses =−− −  (3) 
 
Profit maximization for a competitive bank leads to the following first-order conditions 











                                                 
17 See, e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999, and Claessens, et.al. 2001. 
18 See Ho and Saunders (1981), Sinkey and Carter (2000), Angbazo (1997), Demirguc-Kunt, Laven, and Levine 
(2003). 
19 This model was originally developed by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972).  7
 
The first-order conditions state that a competitive bank will set the marginal cost of 
managing assets equal to the spread.  All the other components of the accounting identity 
drop out because they involve inframarginal profits.  If marginal costs are linear in assets, 
then the spread equation becomes: 
 
12 3 AD rr A K L ββ β −= + +  (5) 
 
If instead of a competitive banking system in which banks take interest rates as 
exogenously given, the banking system is assumed to be a monopoly, then profit 



























Ad r Dd r
ηη =− = ).  In a banking system characterized by an oligopoly, the 
spread will be a function of the number of banks in the system.  In particular, under the 
assumption of a common linear cost function and Cournot behavior, the spread will be 
given by the following expression: 
 








−= + + + +  (7) 
 
where  N is the number of banks.
20  Equation (7) suggests that changes in the 
concentration of a banking system will affect the spread by altering the size of oligopoly 
profits.  Equation (7) emphasizes that increases in the spread are apt to be associated with 
a decline in the number of banks and with an increase in marginal costs of processing 
deposits and assets.   A commonly used empirical proxy for concentration in banking is 
the Herfindahl Index calculated in terms of total assets.  If the Herfindahl index is used as 
a proxy for concentration, then equation (8) becomes: 
 
12 34 AD rr A K L H e r f ββ ββ −= + + +  (8) 
 
Empirical estimates of the spread that are based on this cost function approach include 
Spiller and Favaro (1984), Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (1999, 2000), Ruthenberg and 
Elias (1996), and Corvoisier and Gropp (2001).  In our regressions in this paper we 
                                                 
20 See Freixas and Rochet (1997).  8
assume that marginal costs of making loans are linear in loans, the number of bank 
branches (a form of capital), and the ratio of loans to employee:
21 
 
12 3 4 / AD r r Loans Branches Loans Emp Herf ββ β β −= + + +  (9) 
 
INCORPORATING UNCERTAINTY 
The basic results of equations (8) and (9) rely on a production function approach that 
could be applied to any industry.  What is special about banks is that they bear financial 
risk as an integral part of being financial intermediaries.  There are two fundamental risks 
to consider:  credit risk and liquidity risk.   
 
Credit risk concerns the probability that a borrower will default on a loan.  In order to 
manage credit risk, banks frequently require collateral to back up the loan, incorporate 
restrictive covenants into the use of the loan, and monitor the use of the loan.  This 
suggests two ways in which a riskier loan portfolio will translate into a higher spread.  
First, the more intensive use of the bank’s productive resources to service risky loans will 
raise the spread.  Second, the higher probability of default will result in a risk premium 
on the loan rate even in the presence of restrictive covenants and monitoring.    
 
Empirical studies of bank spreads generally use loan write offs, the delinquent loan 
portfolio, or provisions as indicators of default risk.  The problem with these measures is 
that they are often backward-looking (reflecting realized defaults) rather than forward-
looking proxies for default risk.  In our own empirical work, we use the Superintendence 
of Banks’ risk index, which attempts to be a forward-looking measure of credit risk. 
 
A second type of risk is liquidity risk.  Liquidity risk is similar to dealer risk in securities 
markets.  A dealer providing liquidity to the market faces the risk that subsequent to 
buying a security its price could fall, creating a loss for the dealer.  Similarly, a bank 
faces potential losses from interest rate movements.   
 
In the dealership model originally advanced by Ho and Saunders (1981) the role of a 
bank is to provide liquidity to the market. The provision of liquidity by its own nature 
implies holding a position (either long if it grants too many loans or short if it takes too 
many deposits). In this model, banks are not able to match up deposits with loans since 
they are confronted with stochastic arrivals of depositors and borrowers. Thus, the bank 
has to consider the risk of an unbalanced portfolio I LD =− , i.e. the bank’s net 
inventory that results from its commercial activity.  In this framework it can be shown 

















                                                 
21 This would correspond to a cost function of the form 
2
12 3 C(A,K,L)=( /2)A ln ( ) A KL ββ β ++ . 
22 See Ho and Saunders (1981) or Freixas and Rochet (1997) for the derivation.  9
The term  β α /  is the risk neutral spread
23 that would be chosen by a risk-neutral 
banker
24. The other term is a risk premium, proportional to the risk aversion coefficient 
ρ , and increasing in the variance of return 
2 () I σ on the credit market activities that the 
bank engages in and the size of the transaction (Q).  Finally, the spread is decreasing in 
the level of the monetary policy rate (r).  
 
There are several extensions to the dealership model in the literature. For example Allen 
(1988) includes cross-elasticities of demand between banks products, which induces a 
more active role in managing its inventory risk exposure, and Angbazo (1997) includes 
loan default risk.  It would be straightforward to extend the dealership model to 
international activities as well as transactions both in non-indexed and indexed 
instruments in an inflationary economy. Such extensions would bring out exchange rate 
and inflationary uncertainty risk premiums. 
 
The results of the dealership model can be incorporated with those of the cost-structure 




12 3 4 5 6 7 AD re r r Loans Branches Loans Emp Herf Default ββ β β β βσ β σ −= + + + + + +  (11) 
 
where the two major types of liquidity risk in an open economy are interest rate risk (
2
r σ ) 





OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE SPREAD 
According to a recent Moody’s report, “macroeconomic factors are certainly among the 
most influential sources for variations in credit spreads.”  Nevertheless, there is no 
generally agreed upon model for analyzing the consequences of macroeconomic shocks 
for interest rate spreads.  In some models a positive shock to income lowers spreads by 
improving the net worth of borrowers.
26  In others, a collateral squeeze
27 has an 
ambiguous effect on interest rate spreads, while either a savings squeeze or a credit boom 
decreases spreads unambiguously.
28  The latter results compare to the ambiguous effects 
of a positive expenditure shock (which will be probably translated in a credit boom) in a 
                                                 
23 The size of α  and β  determine the elasticity of the demand for loans and supply of deposits. Consequently the 
ratio  / α β  provides some measure the degree of monopoly power. 
24 Traditional explanations for risk aversion behavior in banks include: management’s inability to diversify its human 
capital, insufficient owner diversification, incentive problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection and 
bankruptcy cost. In practical grounds, the dealership framework needs this assumption for the spread to exist, as well 
as, to ensure a finite bank size. 
25 Ho and Saunders used the net interest margin as the empirical proxy for the interest rate spread.  They used several 
terms (reserves/assets, net fee expense/assets, and net loan chargeoffs/assets) from the NIM accounting identity as 
proxies for the risk-neutral spread. 
26 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), whom identify the CFI with the collateralizable net worth of 
firms, because higher collateral values lower the agency costs associated with the enforcement of loan contracts. 
27 That is to say, a negative shock to assets. 
28 See, for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).  10
different model.
29  Finally, there is a model that predicts that a negative productivity 
shock (that could cause a saving squeeze) will be positively related to bank lending 
spreads.
30  In addition, loan rate stickiness
31 or deposit rate rigidities
32 will add more 
complexity to the effects of macroeconomic shocks to spreads, making it difficult to 
predict the overall change. 
 
Because of the theoretical ambiguity regarding the impact of macroeconomic shocks on 
the spread, we include only a few variables that we think have an easily discernable 
connection to the spread.  The first is the slope of the yield curve, which is the difference 
in yields between 8 year and 90 day inflation-indexed instruments issued by the Central 
Bank.  Because banks are engaged in maturity transformation, we expect that the net 
interest margin and the spread based on balance sheet data will covary positively with the 
spread.  On the other hand, disaggregated spreads based on matched-maturity operations 
in pesos, UFs, and dollars may not show any effect of variations in the term structure of 
interest rates.  The second is a measure of the gap between actual and trend GDP. This 
variable allows us to determine whether empirically there is a relationship between the 
business cycle and interest rate spreads.   
 
We also include an index of capital controls, a dummy variable for the onset of the Asian 
crisis, and an additional dummy related to a regulatory change that required the 
incorporation of commissions in the calculation of the loan rate.  Based on the NIM 
accounting identity approach to spreads (equation 2), we also include the capital/asset 
ratio and noninterest expenses as explanatory variables, even though those variables 
would not be included based on the profit-maximizing approach of the Monti-Klein 
model.  In the end, we estimate a regression equation that combines microstructure 
variables with additional macro and regulatory determinants of spreads:
33 
 
   (12) 
 
                                                 
29 In the modified IS-LM framework of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), for example, the spread will unambiguously 
decrease with a expenditure shock if and only if the demand for loans is sufficiently elastic with respect to the loan rate. 
30 This happens in the model of Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (1999). 
31 Caused for example by smoothing relationship lending as in Petersen and Rajan (1994). 
32 Caused for example by differences in local market concentration as in Neumark and Sharpe (1992). 
33 See Section III for a more precise econometric presentation of the estimating equations, including lag structure, fixed 
effects, and seasonal dummies. 
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III.  Data Description and Empirical Specification 
 
As emphasized in Section II, the most common measure in the empirical literature for a 
bank spread is the net interest margin.  A second measure, the Average Spread, divides 
total interest income by total earning assets, and total interest expenses by total cost 
accruing liabilities. The data needed to construct both measures is taken from the balance 
sheet and income statements of individual banks. In the case of Chile, the 
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) publishes such information 
on a monthly basis.
34 
 
Our second source of data is the Central Bank of Chile (BCCH). In particular, we use a 
dataset constructed at the BCCH
35, which contains loan and deposit interest rates, by 
bank, disaggregated by term and unit of account.  This dataset is available beginning in 
May 1994.  For the purposes of this study, we include data from July 1994 to July 2001.  
The dataset includes all banks operating in the Chilean banking industry during the 
sample period
36.  Table III.1 summarizes the level of disaggregation available: 
 
 
Table III.1: Interest Rate Data Availability 
By Term  By Unit of Account 
Less than 30 days  Chilean Peso (Peso) 
30 to 89 days  Unidad de Fomento (UF) 
90 days to 1 year  US dollar (Dollar) 
1 year to 3 years   
more than 3 years   
 
 
The use of three units of account in Chilean financial markets began in the 1970s as a 
response to high and ongoing inflation from 1973 through the end of the 1970s.  Short-
term peso deposits and loans bearing high nominal interest rates were initially the 
dominant financial instruments following the liberalization of financial markets in 1974.  
That same year the Chilean government introduced an inflation indexation mechanism 
called the Unidad de Fomento (UF).  The UF for any given month is based on the 
previous month’s consumer price index.
37,38 
 
                                                 
34 Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Información Financiera). We are thankful to the Capital Markets Department (Financial 
Policy Division - Central Bank of Chile) for providing us this data set in an electronic form. 
35 Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Research Division. 
36 Banks with few observations and banks with many outliers in terms of spreads and net interest margin data where 
dropped from the sample. We are then left with 27 banks (i = 1,...,N  and  N = 27). Since this is a monthly data set, we 
have 85 time series observations (t = 1,...,T   and  T = 85). The data set is unbalanced. 
37 Daily increments in the value of the UF are calculated by taking (typically) one thirtieth of the rise in the CPI in the 
preceding month.  Since the calculation of the CPI takes about a week, the coverage of the UF begins on the tenth 
calendar day of the month and goes through the ninth day of the succeeding month 
38 The first indexed deposit contracts in UF were introduced in 1976. The UF has proven to be a durable feature of the 
Chilean economy.  Inflation-indexed deposits have allowed the Chilean financial markets to operate as if inflation were 
zero. See the Appendix to Fontaine (1995) for a discussion of the history and properties of the UF.  12
Table III.2 summarizes the total shares of loans and deposits by term and unit of account: 
 
Table III.2: Loan and Deposit Shares 
  Peso UF  Dollar  Total  by  Term 
  Loan Deposit Loan Deposit Loan Deposit  Loan  Deposit 
Less than 30 days  35.5 -  4.7  -  1.2  -  41.4  - 
30 to 89 days  14.2 54.0  8.4  0.9  2.5  10.1  25.1  65.0 
90 days to 1 year  9.4 0.2  13.8  29.4 5.2 1.2 28.4 30.8 
More than 1 year  2.0 0.7 2.8 3.5 0.3 0.0  5.1  4.2 
Total by Unit of Account  61.1 54.9 29.7 33.8  9.2  11.3  100  100 
 
One of the important features of banks is that they engage in asset transformation.  Such 
asset transformation activities usually involve both term structure and unit of account 
transformation. Accounting data tends to average out this important feature of banks’ 
operations.  In order to demonstrate this point, we construct several measures of spread 
using interest rate data for different terms and units of accounts. The first one, which we 
call the long spread, is defined as the difference between loan rates in pesos for more 
than 1 year and deposit rates in pesos from 30 to 89 days. The other three spreads use 
loan and deposit interest rates at similar maturities. For the peso spread and UF spread 
we choose the most important maturities, which are 30 to 89 days and 90 days to 1 year, 
respectively
39.  Finally, given the relative thinness of the market for loans and deposits in 
dollars, which amounts on average to only 10% of total loans and deposits, we construct 
a more mixed measure for the dollar spread. The latter includes all loans and deposits in 
dollars with maturity greater than 30 days and shorter that 1 year, which covers almost 
ninety percent of loans and almost one hundred percent of deposits in that currency. 
 
In summary, our dependent variables for banking spreads both from accounting and 











Total Interest Income Total Interest Expenses
Average Spread  
Total Earning Assets Total Accruing Liabilities
  





More than 1 year 30-89 days
Loans in Pesos Deposists in Pesos Long Spread ii =−  
 
                                                 
39 Notice that for the case of peso loans the largest share by term corresponds to less than 30 days. However, there is no 
deposit interest rate counterpart to construct a spread for such a term, since law prohibits time deposits for less than 30 
days. Therefore, we use 30 to 89 days, the second largest loan share in pesos.  13
4. 
30-89 days 30-89 days
Loans in Pesos Deposists in Pesos Peso Spread ii =−  
 
5.  =−
90 days-1 year  90 days-1 year
Loans in UF Deposists in UF UF Spread ii  
 
6.  =−
30 days-1 year  30 days-1 year
Loans in Dollars Deposists in Dollars Dollars Spread ii 
 
 
Figure III.1 shows the evolution of our measures of spreads within the sample period.  
The NIM and the Average Spread, which are constructed from balance sheet data, are 
much smoother than the long spread, the peso spread, and the dollar spread.  The UF 
spread is also relatively smooth, primarily because the Central Bank’s monetary policy 
targeted the price-level indexed interest rate.  The large movements in the interest rate 
spreads in late 1997 and 1998 reflect the domestic response to the Asian and Russian 
crises. 
 
Figure III.1: Measures of Spreads
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For the purpose of organizing the discussion of the results in section IV, the explanatory 
variables will be classified within five categories. The first one corresponds to bank 
characteristics. These include implicit interest payments, capital adequacy, asset quality, 
and management efficiency.  All of these variables are constructed from the data 
published by the SBIF.  Whereas the first category accounts for idiosyncratic 
characteristics/risks, the second group of variables controls for aggregate risks that are 
related to spreads through the risk premium. The third group of variables is related to 
industry structure, and the fourth group to some relevant policy issues associated with  14
spreads, typically included in both the theoretical and empirical literature of banking 
spreads. These are the relation of spreads to the business cycle, monetary policy and 
capital account controls. Finally, we include two dummy variables aimed to account for 
some important events that occurred over the sample period. Table III.3 contains the 
specific description of the explanatory variables. 
 
 
  Table III.3: Variables Description   
Variable Specific  Description   
Implicit Payments  Implicit Interest Payments
40 
Capital/Assets  Capital Ratio (Adjusted Equity
41 over Adjusted Assets
42) 
Asset Quality  Risk Index of the Loan’s Portfolio
43 
Loans/Employees  Total Loans over Number of Employees 
BANK 
CHARACTERISTICS
Interest Rate Volatility  Interest Rate Risk
44 




Size  Total Assets of Banki over Total Assets of the Banking System 
Branches  Number of Branches 
Concentration  Herfindahl Index in Terms of Total Loans 
INDUSTRY 
STRUCTURE 
Slope of the Yield Curve  Slope of the Yield Curve
46 
Output Gap  Deviation of Log(IMACEC
47) from its Trend (HP filter) 
Capital Controls  Index of Capital Account Controls 
POLICY 
ISSUES 
Asian Crisis  Dummy that Takes Value of 1 After the Asian Crisis
48 







An important question before engaging in a Panel Data estimation is whether or not such 
an analysis incorporates valuable information. A common way to answer this question is 
to look at the dispersion of data among banks and over time. Table III.4 shows the 
coefficient variations (the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean) for the 
variables that span both cross-sections and time. For most of the variables considered in 
our analysis the dispersion among banks is much larger than the dispersion over time. 
This finding has also being reported in other countries. As stated by Brock and Rojas-
                                                 
40 Overhead costs + commissions expenses – commissions income. This variable is aimed to account for service charge 
remissions. 
41 Equity + voluntary provisions + subordinated bonds – investments in related enterprises - investments in branches 
abroad. 
42 Total assets – forward liabilities – other accounting adjustments. 
43 This index is calculated by the SBIF.  A higher index number implies a lower quality of assets. 
44 Measured as the monthly average daily standard deviation of the interbank interest rate. 
45 Measured as the monthly average daily standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate. 
46 Measured by the difference between PRC8 and PRBC90. These are 8-years and 90-days maturity UF instruments 
issued by the BCCH, respectively. 
47 IMACEC is the Monthly Index of Economic Activity. 
48 Second half of 1997. 
49 The interest rate of any loan must include now any type of commissions. Such regulations are part of the new 
guidelines to calculate maximum loan rates. They took place in mid-1999 for loans with maturity larger than 90 days 
and the first quarter of 2000 for loans with a shorter maturity.  15
Suarez (2000), such striking differences imply that “it may be misleading to focus on 
aggregates to understand the behavior of spreads”. 
 
 
Table III.4: Coefficient Variations 
Variable  Over Time  Among Banks 
Net Margin  0.21 1.18 
Long Spread  0.20 1.15 
Peso Spread  0.23 0.39 
UF Spread  0.12 0.21 
Dollar Spread  0.21 0.19 
Implicit Payments
  0.16 0.86 
Capital/Assets  0.10 0.85 
Asset Quality  0.28 0.30 
Loans/Employees  0.16 0.59 
Size  0.10 1.15 
Branches  0.12 1.14 
 
Finally, descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables included in our 
regressions are shown in table III.5. 
 
 
Table III.5: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in the Regressions 
Variable 
N° of Banks  N° of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Net Margin
  27 2199 6,7  7,8  0,0 43,4 
Average Spread  27 2199 6,1  8,0  0,0 43,7 
Long Spread  27 2206  15,1 6,7  0,0 43,0 
Peso Spread  27  2206  0,4 0,3 0,0 2,3 
UF Spread  27  2206  2,6 0,9 0,3 9,7 
Dollar Spread
  27 2242 4,3  1,4  0,0 10,3 
Implicit Payments
  27 2199 2,6  1,7  0,4 12,2 
Capital/Assets  27 2196  14,3  12,7 4,7 82,0 
Asset Quality  27  2203  1,6 1,0 0,1 8,9 
Loans/Employees  27  2203 41,5 25,5  3,4 151,8 
Interest Rate Volatility   85  2,1  2,3  0,2  12,7 
Exchange Rate Volatility    85  48,6 44,8  4,8 318,6 
Size  27 2203 3,5  3,9  0,0 16,6 
Branches  27  2203 57,2 65,8  1,0 302,0 
Concentration    85 8,5 0,8 7,0 9,3 
Slope of the Yield Curve    85 -0,2 1,3 -8,7 1,5 
Output Gap    85 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Capital Controls   85  30,5  21,7  0,0  60,5 
Asian Crisis    85 0,6 0,5 0,0 1,0 
Regulatory Change    85 0,3 0,5 0,0 1,0 
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The empirical specification outlined above (in words) can be summarized as follows: 
 
               −− =+ α + γ + β + φ +δ +δ +δ +
'
1 , 1 , 2 Asian Crisis Reg. Change Seasonal '' it i i t i t t A R S it y cy x z d d d u  (13) 
 
where  1,..., iN = ,  2,..., tT = ,  .. . it ui i d ,  it y  is the dependent variable, i.e. net margin, 
average spread, long spread, peso spread, UF spread, or dollar spread;  ,2 it x −  is a vector of 
bank-specific explanatory variables,  t z  is a vector of non bank-specific explanatory 
variables,  Asian Crisis d  and  Reg. Change d  are two events controlled by means of dummy 
variables, and  Seasonal d  is a set of seasonal dummies. Finally,  α γβ φ δδδ    
'
1 , , ,,, , , iA R S c  is a 
vector of parameters, with  i α  representing the Fixed-Effects. Notice that the bank-
specific explanatory variables, i.e. those constructed from the information published by 
the SBIF, are included with two lags to account for the delay in this information to be 
publicly available.
 50  Details regarding the estimation procedure are left to the Appendix. 
 
 
IV.  Results 
 
Our analysis of the results (table IV.1) will be organized in terms of the five groups of 
variables defined in section III
51.  As a brief overview, the major differences between the 
results based on balance sheet data and the results based on interest rate data arise in the 
areas of industry structure and macro/monetary policy issues.   
 
BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
The variable noninterest expenses, which is defined as the ratio of overhead costs minus 
net commissions divided by earning assets, is typically included in net margin 
regressions.  These overhead costs and commissions must be covered by banks 
somewhere in their operations, so higher costs may be associated with higher spreads.  
On the other hand, higher costs may show up as lower profits with no correlation with 
spreads.  To the extent that higher costs are indeed correlated with higher spreads, the 
correlation could reflect market power or it could reflect that high costs of operations are 
required to make higher-yielding loans (riskier or smaller loans).  Table IV.1 indicates 
that the NIM and the Average Spread as well as two of the four interest rate spreads are 
positively correlated with noninterest expenses.   
 
The NIM accounting identity (equation 2) predicts that bank equity capital should be 
positively correlated with the spread.  On the other hand, the single-period profit-
maximizing approach of the Monti-Klein model followed in equation (3) suggests that 
bank equity should be uncorrelated with the spread.  Table IV.1 indicates that the sign of 
the regression coefficient on the capital/asset ratio is actually negative for all five 
                                                 
50 Under certain circumstances, bank fundamentals may be endogenously determined. This lag structure mitigates the 
potential problem of endogeneity. 
51 For details, see table III.5.  17
measures of spreads, with significant coefficients for three of the spreads.  This result 
may be consistent with an alternative maximizing approach in which the structure of the 
bank’s balance sheet affects the incentives to take risk.  Less capitalized banks have more 
incentive to take on additional risk (resulting in higher spreads) in order to gamble for 
high returns. On the other hand, more capitalized banks tend to make more conservative 
loans (resulting in lower spreads) because there is more shareholder capital at risk.  
 
Asset quality is an index of loan portfolio risk that is calculated by the Superintendency 
of Banks. This ex-ante proxy for default risk is preferable to the ex-post measure 
provided by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  The regression results at 
first appear puzzling.  While the peso spread increases with the risk index, the average 
spread decreases (as do three other spreads, although not statistically significantly).  A 
plausible explanation is that deposit rates in Chile are sensitive to risk.
52  This factor 
would produce a negative correlation between asset quality and spreads that is shown in 
Table IV.1.  If problems with asset quality are concentrated in peso loans, rather than in 
inflation-indexed or dollar loans, then the peso spread could simultaneously be positively 
correlated with the asset quality variable.
53  
 
Management efficiency (Loans/Employees) is measured by the ratio of total loans to the 
number of employees
54. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship for 
the NIM, the average spread, and the dollar spread. A high value of loans per employee 
may reflect efficient processing of loans, or it may reflect the type of loan (e.g., large 
versus small). In either case, the negative sign is consistent with the industrial 
organization approach of the Monti-Klein model.  
 
AGGREGATE RISK 
We use interbank interest rate volatility as a proxy for liquidity (interest rate) risk faced 
by the banking industry.  The parameter values are positive for all six spreads, and are 
significant for four out of the six.  These results strongly confirm the predictions of the 
dealership model (where banks are modeled as if they were securities dealers) 
55.  In 
addition to interest rate risk, we use exchange rate volatility as a proxy for exchange rate 
risk.   The results are similar, except that increased exchange rate uncertainty is correlated 
with a smaller spread on dollar operations.   
 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
We find that the NIM, average spread, the peso spread, and the UF spread are positively 
correlated with bank size.  These results suggest that larger banks have market power that 
results in larger spreads.   Alternatively, large banks may be operating at beyond optimal 
                                                 
52 See Brock and Rojas (2000) for corroborating evidence. 
53 Loans denominated in UF and dollars are generally higher quality than peso loans, many of which are either personal 
consumption loans or commercial loans for working capital. 
54 Thus, higher managerial costs should be shown up as a decrease on this ratio. 
55 See, for example, the original dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981) or Angbazo’s (1997) extensions of that 
model.  18
size.
56  Large bank size is also negatively correlated with the long spread (1-3 year peso 
loan rate minus 30-89 day peso deposit rate).  Altering asset duration (as opposed to 
acting as a broker) is a significant source of income for banks.  Banks are able to take on 
asset transformation risk, partly because they enjoy deposit insurance.  The regression 
results show that large banks are more aggressive at maturity transformation (they charge 
a smaller premium).  This could be because of better risk-management skills or because 
large banks fall into a “too big to fail” category that allows them to take this type of risk. 
 
The sign of the parameter for branches is always negative except for the long spread.  
These mirror image results (compared to the results for bank size) suggest that banks with 
many branches compete more as brokers (implying lower spreads for peso, UF, and 
dollar matched operations) and are not as aggressive at asset transformation (implying a 
higher long spread).
57   
 
The third I/O type variable is concentration. The literature contains two opposite 
hypotheses regarding the impact of concentration on the pricing behavior of banks.
58  The 
structure-performance hypothesis (SPH) claims that a more concentrated banking 
industry will behave oligopolistically, while the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESH) 
claims that concentration will produce efficiency gains as more efficient banks take over 
less efficient ones.  In terms of the Monti-Klein model, greater concentration should 
result in higher spreads, while enhanced efficiency (such as labor cost savings) should 
reduce spreads. 
 
Our results show that the NIM and average spread increase with concentration, but that 
the peso, UF, and dollar spreads all decrease with concentration.  This suggests that 
banks provide brokerage services (same maturity loan and deposit operations) at lower 
cost as concentration increases.  However the positive effect of concentration on the NIM 
and Average Spread suggests that concentration also permits banks to increase other 
marginal spreads.  For example, Fuentes and Basch (2000) have noted that Chilean banks 
frequently take risky positions with regard to movements in the exchange rate
59.   
 
POLICY ISSUES   
Interest rate margins and spreads respond to changes in monetary policy, the business 
cycle, and capital account controls.  To capture the relation of spreads with monetary 
policy we use the slope of the yield curve.  To capture the relationship of spreads with the 
business cycle we use the deviation of output from its long-term trend (output gap).  
                                                 
56 Budnevich, Franken, and Paredes (2001) provides evidence that larger banks within the Chilean Banking System 
may actually be in a larger than optimum (horizontal and conglomerated) size, thereby incurring in diseconomies of 
scale or scope.    
57 Alternatively, the negative coefficients could suggest that bank branches provide efficiency gains.  However, it is 
difficult to explain the sign of the long peso spread with that explanation. 
58 See Berger and Hannan (1989). 
59 We would like to warn our audience that we do not think this reduced form regression can provide a sophisticated 
view of the impact of concentration on the pricing behavior of banks.  In order to extract policy implications about this 
issue, a more complete model of the market structure as well as the equilibrium conditions for different types of loans 
and deposits is needed. Such a model is beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for future research.  19
Finally, capital account controls are included by means of a composite index that 
summarizes restrictions on both inflows and outflows. 
 
Both the NIM and the Average Spread are positively correlated with increases in the 
slope of the yield curve.  The long spread is also positively correlated with the slope of 
the yield curve.  In contrast, the peso and UF interest rate spreads are negatively 
correlated with the slope of the yield curve.  These results suggest that a steeper yield 
curve increases the NIM and the Average Spread because these spreads reflect a mixture 
of long-term and short-term assets.  However, the peso spread and UF spread are matched 
maturity (deposit and loan) spreads, and these spreads are negatively correlated with the 
slope of the yield curve.   
 
A steep yield curve is often associated with expansionary monetary policy.  Our 
empirical results suggest that banks benefit from expansionary monetary policy by higher 
spreads, an observation that has been noted in other contexts.  Expansionary monetary 
policy allows banks more easily to take duration risk.  On the other hand, our results 
suggest that banks do worse with matched maturity operations during periods of 
expansionary monetary policy.  To our knowledge this result has not been noted before, 
but it suggests that a loosening of monetary policy may help banks that are actively 
engaged in term transformation while hurting banks that match loan and deposit 
maturities. 
 
We find results for the output gap that come close to replicating those of the yield curve 
slope.  In particular, the NIM, Average Spread, and long spread are all procyclical.   
Among the matched maturity spreads, the peso spread is also procyclical, while the UF 
and dollar spreads are countercyclical.  To the extent that the slope of the yield curve is 
positively correlated with the output gap, then the similarity of the results is not 
surprising.  Nevertheless, in the Chilean context it is useful to draw the parallel results. 
 
Finally, among this group of variables, are capital account controls. The Central Bank of 
Chile imposed a capital control in the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement on 
selective capital inflows in 1991. This reserve requirement varied over time until 
September 1998, when it was abolished. Other quantitative and administrative controls 
on capital inflows and outflows were also relaxed during the 1990s.  We capture this 
capital account controls by means of a composite index (outflows and inflows) 
constructed from the measures proposed by Gallego, Hernández and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2002). According to their study, an increase in the unremunerated reserve requirement 
puts upward pressure on the deposit rate, thereby lowering spreads.
 60  However other 
administrative and quantitative capital controls were related to outflows, so the overall 
effect in unclear. We found a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
capital controls and all spreads, except the Dollar spread. The positive and statistically 
significant parameter of the latter spread makes sense since capital controls on inflows 
and outflows restrict the substitutes of dollar transactions, thereby lowering competition 
in that market. 
                                                 
60 This unremunerated reserve requirement increases the cost of external (foreign) funding by banks. Hence, in order to 
attract domestic funds banks have to raise deposits rates.  20
 
DUMMY VARIABLES 
The Asian crisis began to unfold during the second half of 1997.
61  The dummy variable 
for the Asian crisis (0 through 1997:2, 1 from 1997:3 onward) produces virtually the 
identical impact on spreads as the capital controls variable.  All spreads were negatively 
correlated with the Asian crisis dummy variable except the dollar spread, which was 
positive.  The Asian crisis produced a sharp contraction of capital flows to Chile and the 
rest of Latin America.  The empirical results indicate that restrictions on capital flows, 
whether by caused by controls or by external events, lower NIMs, Average Spreads, long 
spreads, and matched maturity spreads for pesos and UFs.   
 
The compulsory inclusion of commissions in loan rates took place in mid-1999 for loans 
with maturity larger than 90 days and in the first quarter of 2000 for loans with a shorter 
maturity.
62 The NIM and average spread regressions do not include a dummy for the 
regulatory change, since commissions are already included in the calculation of these 
spreads. One should expect loan rates and spreads to increase after this regulatory 
change. This is exactly what we find for the Pesos and UF spreads. However, the 
parameter value for the dummy related the regulatory change is negative for the Dollar 
spread. 
                                                 
61  It is important to say that such a period coincides with the sign-up and implementation of the Basel capital 
requirements by Chile. Although this regulatory change may also play a role in the magnitude, sign and statistical 
significance of this dummy variable, we believe that the Asian crisis plays a far more relevant role. 
62 They included some important changes in the way to calculate maximum loan rates.  21
 
 
Table IV.1: Results of the Regressions 
(Method: Bias Corrected Fixed effects, GLS-Weighted, WHC-Robust Cov. Matrix) 
  Accounting Data  Interest Rate Data 
           
 
Net 
Margin   
Average 




Spread   
UF 
Spread   
Dollar 
Spread   
Net Margint-1  0,8758  *                 
Average Spreadt-1     0,7965 *              
Long Spreadt-1       0,5938 *           
Peso Spreadt-1            0,4656 *       
UF Spreadt-1               0,3286  *    
Dollar Spreadt-1                  0,6185 * 
Implicit Paymentst-2  0,0293  **  0,0996 *  0,2749 *** -0,0047   0,0882  * -0,0035  
(Capital/Asset)t-2  -0,0020   -0,0114 *  -0,0380 *** -0,0008   -0,0164  * -0,0066  
Asset Qualityt-2  0,0034   -0,0287 * -0,0666  0,0130 * -0,0160    -0,0122  
(Loans/Employees)t-2  -0,0022  *  -0,0045 * -0,0127   -0,0001   -0,0015    -0,0038 * 
Interest Rate Volatility  0,0043  *  0,0243 * 0,0022   0,0120 *  0,0189  * 0,0073  
Exchange Rate Volatility  0,0005  *  0,0010 *  0,0046 ** 0,0001   0,0005  *  -0,0014 * 
Sizet-2  0,0053  *  0,0122 *  -0,1958 *  0,0028 *  0,0363  * -0,0105  
Branchest-2  -0,0011  *  -0,0019 *  0,0117 **  -0,0007 *  -0,0046  *  -0,0013 ** 
Concentrationt-2  0,0292  *  0,0415 * 0,0081   -0,0037 *  -0,0127  *  -0,0420 * 
Slope of the Yield Curve  0,0100  *  0,0338 *  0,2638 *  -0,0144 *  -0,1244  * 0,0164  
Output Gapt-6  0,0237  *  0,0337 *  0,2310 *  0,0047 *  -0,0549  *  -0,0471 * 
Capital Controls  -0,0013  *  -0,0028 *  -0,0241 *  -0,0005 *  -0,0031  *  0,0108 * 
Asian Crisis  -0,0853  *  -0,1593 *  -0,8824 *  -0,0287 * -0,0286    0,2489 * 
Regulatory Change       0,6901   0,0793 *  0,1489  *  -0,2656 * 
                    
Adjusted R-squared  0,5010   0,5588   0,4015   0,3151   0,7916   0,6720  
                    
(*)      1% significance level 
(**)    5% significance level 
(***) 10% significance level 




V.  Conclusions 
 
Studies of bank spreads have generally relied on the net interest margin as the measure of 
the cost of intermediation.  The availability of more disaggregated data has recently 
allowed researchers to explore other spreads.  In particular, Catao’s (1998) work on dual 
currency markets in Argentina and Corvoisier and Gropp’s (2001) study of banking 
concentration in the European Union have demonstrated the value of disaggregated 
interest rate spreads for banking industry analysis.   
 
In this paper we have calculated net interest margins (NIMs) and average spreads from 
balance sheet and income statements.  In addition we have used individual bank data to 
calculate matched maturity spreads for Peso, UF, and Dollar operations as well as to 
construct a long spread (long-term Peso loan rate minus short-term Peso deposit rate).  
This is the first study to use individual bank interest rate data in conjunction with balance 
sheet data to study issues that affect the cost of financial intermediation. 
 
We find that the matched maturity spreads are conceptually similar to bid-ask spreads in 
securities markets, an idea that was originally put forward by Ho and Saunders (1981).   
In contrast, the long spread captures the premium that banks charge for bearing duration 
risk.  The brokerage function and term transformation functions of banks are blurred in 
the NIMs and Average Spreads, since all interest income and expenses are aggregated to 
create implicit returns on assets and liabilities.  Nevertheless, the NIM and the Average 
Spread are important because aggregation highlights the overall profitability of bank 
management across different loan and deposit activities, as well as the role of noninterest 
income activities. 
 
We find that the estimated impacts of industry concentration, business cycle variables, 
and monetary policy variables differ markedly between interest rate spreads based on 
balance sheet data and interest rate spreads based on disaggregated loan and deposit data.  
Since empirical work on interest spreads is used for guiding policy recommendations, 
these findings potentially have important implications for the interpretation of interest 
spreads regressions.  Our analysis calls for some caution in the interpretation of estimated 
empirical determinants of bank spreads that are constructed from income statements and 
balance sheet data. At the same time, our analysis shows how implicit interest rate 
spreads constructed from balance sheets and income statements can be combined with 
disaggregated interest rate spreads to create a more complete portrait of bank behavior 
than either type alone is capable of creating.  The results for Chile suggest the potential 
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A1. Estimation Procedure 
 
Most of the empirical literature constraints  1 γ  in (13) to be equal to zero, i.e. does not 
include a lag dependent variable. They are implicitly assuming that all regressors are 
strictly exogenous. Such an assumption in the fixed T-large N asymptotic framework is 
fundamental for the consistency of the Fixed-Effects estimator. The following example 
will help to see why. Suppose  3 T =  and the simpler version of the model 
,1  with    .. . it i t i it it yy u u i i d γ α − =+ +  Thus, to get the within (fixed-effects) estimator we 
regress () () 32 21  on  . ii ii yy yy −−  That is to say, () () () 32 21 32 . ii ii ii yy yy uu γ −= −+−  It is 
clear that this is not longer a well-structured model since  2 i y  contains  2 i u  by definition. 





−  =  
γ
γ . We can see that the Fixed-Effects estimator in a dynamic context is 
severely biased. Such a bias decreases as T increases. But, since we are still in the fixed 
T-large N asymptotic framework, there is no way to fix the problem. 
 
The origin of the problem is the presence of a weakly exogenous regressor. In the more 
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As noted by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), such feature suggests a natural 
instrument. First differencing the model to remove  i α  produces the model 
 
              () () () () ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 it i t it i t it i t it i t yy xx yy uu βγ −− − − −= − + − + −  
 
which is estimable by instrumental variables.  
 
Assuming,  ,1 ,2 ,3 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,  ,,  ,, i t it it it i t it it it u u yy u u yy −− − −− − ⊥ ⇒ −⊥ ……  , the set of instruments is: 
                                                 














−− −−   =→







Ny y y yEy y y y











−−   =+ =−
  −−  
ii ii u
ii ii
Ey y u u




Finally, work backwards from  ,1 it i t i it yy u γα − =+ +.  30
 































Notice that the set of instruments is increasing over time. Hence, there should be enough 
instruments for consistent estimation of  and . γβ  Arellano and Bond (1991) worked with 




So, the Arellano and Bond GMM procedure is common used when estimating a dynamic 
panel model within the fixed T-large N asymptotic framework. However, with larger T, 
there is a potential problem with the over-identifying restrictions, since GMM estimators 
with too many over-identifying restrictions may perform poorly in small samples
65. 
Moreover, as noted by Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2002), if a numerically 
identically minimum distance estimator is considered, it becomes crystal clear that the 
GMM estimator is equivalent to a linear combination of 2SLS estimators. The latter has 
long been known to be subject to substantial finite sample bias. 
 
Notice, however, that in our particular application, the fixed T-large N asymptotic 
framework is not very appropriate. An alternative framework, which is likely to be more 
appropriate, is to assume the following asymptotic approximation: 0l i m
N
T
<< ∞ . Hahn 
and Kuersteiner (2002) show that under this alternative asymptotic approximation the 
Maximum Likelihood (which is equivalent to the OLS) estimation of a dynamic panel 
data model with Fixed-Effects is consistent and asymptotically normal, although it is not 
centered at the true value of the parameter. The non-centrality parameter captures bias of 
order 
1 () OT
− . However, they proposed a bias-corrected estimator by examining the non-
centrality parameter
66, and by showing that the bias-corrected MLE is asymptotically 
efficient. An algorithm to estimate a bias-corrected dynamic panel data model with 
Fixed-Effects in a multivariate context is included in appendix A2. 
                                                 
64 This matrix does not only include lagged levels of the dependent variable, but also lagged levels of predetermined 
variables (i.e. variables for which the error term at time t has some feedback on the subsequent realizations of it) and 
differences of strictly exogenous regressors. 
65 It has been found that the standard GMM estimators suffer from substantial finite sample biases. See Alonso-Borrego 
and Arellano (1999). 
66 For the univariate model  ,1 it i t i it yy u γα − =+ + they show that the bias-corrected estimator is 
+
θ= θ+
     11 T
TT
 
where    θ  is the MLE (OLS) Fixed-Effects estimator.  31
 
There is one important caveat to this relatively simple solution: under unit root the bias-
corrected estimator will not be (approximately) unbiased. We performed the unit root 
tests proposed by Choi (2001a), which are the following: 
 














































where N is the number of cross-sectional units included in the panel,  i p  is the p-value of 
a unit root test
67 and  () Φ i  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. These 
tests have an asymptotic standard normal distribution.
68 
 
Given the absence of a unit root for our dependent and independent variables, as we 
concluded from the previous exercise, we follow the methodology proposed by Hahn and 
Kuersteiner.
69 
                                                 
67 Choi recommends using the Dickey-Fuller-GLS
µ  test. 
68 There are other unit root tests for Panel Data in the literature, such as the ones proposed by Im, Pesaram, and Shin 
(1997) and Levin and Lin (1992). However, Im et al. show that their tests have better finite sample performances 
compared to those proposed by Levin and Lin, as well as, Choi (2001b) shows that his tests outperform Im et al. tests in 
finite samples. Therefore, we concentrate only in the above three tests proposed by Choi. 
69 The results of the tests are available upon request.  32




Suppose you have the following model: 
 
1, 1 , it i i t i t it y cy x u − =+ α + γ + β +  
 
where  1,..., iN = ,  2,..., tT = ,  it x  is an strictly exogenous regressor and   .. . it ui i d . 
 
1.  Eliminate individual effects by subtracting individual means 
 

































=− ∑ . 
 
2.  Run the regression 
() 1 i i it it y yx x −= θ −  
and call the residuals  
it y . 
 
3.  Run the regression 
() ,1 2 i i it i t y yx x − − −= θ −  
and call the residuals  
,1 it y − . 
 
4.  Run the regression 
   
,1 1 it i t yy − =γ  
using the residuals of the two previous regressions.  
Call the estimator from this regression  1 γ  . 
 





γ = γ +
      
This is now your bias-corrected estimate of  1 γ . 
 
6.  Define  () 1 ,1 ii it it i t zyy y y − − =− − γ −
     and run the regression    () i it it zx x =β −  
to obtain an estimate of β . 
                                                 
70 We are thankful to Jinyong Hahn for sending us copies of his cited co-authored papers and to Guido Kuersteiner for 
providing us with this relatively simple algorithm. 